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Abstract 
The purpose of the study is to explore the link between corporate governance mechanisms and firms financing 
decisions. We have selected 24 banks which were listed on the “Karachi Stock Exchange”, during the period of 
2008-2012. The Ownership Concentration, composition and size of the board, and role duality were considered 
as independent corporate governance variables while firm specific control variables were size, liquidity, 
profitability and tangibility of assets. Debt ratio is taken as a dependent variable representing firm’s financing 
decision (capital structure). The results indicate that Ownership Concentration, Size of the board, and leverage 
are positively correlated. However no significant relationship was found between Board composition, CEO 
duality and capital structure. We use panal least square regression to determine the affect of corporate 
governance and firm level characteristics on capital structure. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance (CG) has gained a lot of attention in the last decade from different interested parties such 
as regulators, professional bodies and academics. However, despite this fact, no specific definition has won 
general agreement among these parties Solomon (2007). Therefore, the traditional literature on corporate 
governance approaches the subject from various angles and reveals a number of definitions based on different 
business environments and corporate systems. In its narrowest sense, (Shahid, 2001, p. 3) defined CG as "the set 
of rules and incentives by which the management of a company is directed and controlled in order to maximize 
the profitability and long term value of the firm for shareholders". This definition tends to accord with the 
agency theory, in which companies should act in favour of shareholders by maximizing their profits Shahid 
(2001). In a broader sense OECD (2004, p. 1) describes CG as a set of relationship between a firms management 
its board its directors and other stakeholders.   
Capital structure is basically a mix of company’s leverage and equity that a firm uses to finance its assets Gul et 
al, (2012). By issuing bonds or long-term notes payable firms can generate debt, while equity consists of 
common stock and preferred stock. The proportion of debt in capital structure is measured by leverages. The 
capital structure decision has played a very pivotal role in the establishment and growth of firms for many years. 
Capital structure decisions provide opportunities that help in increasing the wealth of the shareholders. The 
article tries to explore the link between corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure for a sample of 
24 listed banks in the “Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)” during the period 2008-2012. The reminder of the paper 
is as follow. Section 2 highlights the prior literature on corporate governance and capital structure. Section 3 
addresses the methodology and measurement of variables and sections 4 discuss analysis of results and 
conclusion. 
2. Literature Review   
It has been found in prior literature that capital structure decisions are affected by corporate governance 
mechanisms for example Berger et al, (1997); Wen et al, (2003) and Abor (2007). Main corporate governance 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.23, 2013 
 
75 
mechanisms identified in the literature are size and composition of the board, CEO/Chair duality, tenure of the 
CEO and CEO compensation etc. Size of the board and capital structure was found to be positively correlated in 
previous studies such as Wen et al (2002) and Abor (2007). They argue that in order to increase firm 
performance firms with larger board’s uses higher leverage in their capital structure because larger boards are 
more entrenched and are more closely monitored by regulatory authorities.  However an inverse association was 
found in a study by Berger et al (1997) between size of the board and firms leverage. Furthermore significant 
association was found between board size and leverage in studies by Pfeffer and Salancick (1978) and Lipton 
and Llorsch (1992). Large size boards are associated with higher agency problems which weakens corporate 
governance due to which leverage increases, however low leverage firms have fewer numbers of outside 
directors Jensen (1986). Duality is another variable which is extensively investigated in prior literature to have 
an effect on leverage; duality means that same person acts as CEO and chairman of the firm. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that in order to reduce agency problem the roles must be performed by different persons. If dual 
roles are performed by same individual it will be difficult for management to perform its key objective which is 
to evaluate manager’s performance. Thus Fama and Jensen suggest splitting the monitoring of decisions from 
implementation of decisions to reduce agency problems. It was found in a study by Fosberg (2004) that firms 
with split roles uses higher amount of leverage, but this relation was statistically insignificant. On the other hand 
Positive association was found by Abor and Biekpe (2007) between duality and firms leverage. Non executive 
directors is an important corporate governance mechanism which increases a firms capability because outside 
investors have more confidence on firms with more non executives in board decision making Pfeffer and 
Salancick (1978). Jensen (1986) argues that companies with increased leverage have fewer non executive 
directors. In a study by Abor and Biekpe (2007) in the context of Ghana found that non executive directors and 
CEO duality have positive correlation with firm’s capital structure.  
Jasir ilyas (2008) during the period 2000-2005 in Pakistani listed non financial firms show that most of the firm 
tends toward the internal financing instead of the debt. In Pakistan debt or long term financing is not considered 
as prior to internal equity financing because the bond market in Pakistan is not yet so developed. Titman & 
Wessels (1988), using data from US industrial companies found that variable tangibility has insignificant affect 
on leverage. However leverage and profitability were found to have negative correlation. In a comparative study 
Rajan & Zingales (1995) use profitability, size, tangibility and growth and found that profitability, tangibility 
and growth are negatively related to debt ratio. Whereas size and debt ratio were insignificantly correlated. 
Fitim-Deari and Media-Deari (2009) in his investigation into Macedonian companies during the period 2005-
2007 argue that in Macedonia financial market is poor and bondholders are absent thus, they don’t prefer to issue 
bonds to borrow money. They found that their sample firms use internally generated funds to finance assets. 
Tariq, Majed and Zia-ur-rehman (2011) done his work on data taken from Pakistani listed sugar and allied 
industry firms and provide mix results. They found that profitability is negatively correlated with leverage, 
whereas tangibility and leverage have strong positive correlation, while the remaining variables were statistically 
insignificant.  
3. Research Methodology  
The sample for the study consisted of companies in the banking sectors that were listed in the “Karachi Stock 
Exchange” during the period 2008 to 2012. Companies that were not listed in the “Karachi Stock Exchange”, for 
the duration of the five year period were left out. Companies that did not have a full set of data on variables 
mention in the study were also left out. Statistical analysis techniques were used to provide descriptive statistics 
to determine the mean, median, standard deviation of each construct variable. Panal regression analysis was used 
in the study. 
The general form of our model is: 
     n 
DR it=α+∑ βi X εit…………………………………………………………………. (1) 
                i 
DR it = firms i debt ratio at time t, 
α = the intercept  
βi= the change co-efficient for Xit variables 
X it = firm’s i independent variable at time t 
3.1 Variables of the Study 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
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3.1.1.1 Debt Ratio 
Following Rajan & Zingales (1995), Booth et al, (2001) and Beven & Danbolt (2002) we define debt ratio 
(financial leverage) as: 
Debt ratio (DR it) =total debt/total assets 
3.1.1.2 Board size 
In this study size of the board is taken as an independent variable, because of its importance in the strategic 
decisions of a company like capital structure. We have taken the proxy of natural log of total board members to 
measure size of the board.  
3.1.1.3 Board composition 
This variable is measured by the number of non executive directors divided by total directors on the board. 
Outside investors prefer a firm with more non-executive directors because it is a signal that the firm is monitored 
efficiently. Therefore such firms can obtain funds from the capital market on better terms.  
3.1.1.4 CEO/Chair Duality 
A dummy variable duality is used in the study which takes the value of 1 if CEO is chairman; otherwise 0. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argue that a corporation needs to have different persons as CEO and chairman in order to 
reduce agency conflicts. In light of entrenchment hypothesis if both the roles are performed by same individual 
then it will lead to managerial opportunistic behavior and can lead to lower leverage.  
3.1.1.5 Ownership Concentration (OC) 
Ownership concentration is measured by the amount of stock owned by individual investors and large-block 
shareholders divided by total share 
3.1.1.6 Firm Size 
There are mix results about the relationship of size and debt ratio. Researchers such as Titman and Wessels 
(1988), justify the positive relationship between size and debt ratio. Large firms are more diversified and have 
less chances of bankruptcy thus lenders prefer larger firms. According to Um (2001) firm size may proxy for the 
debt agency costs (monitoring cost) which arise from the conflict between managers and investors. Size is 
proxied by total assets.   
3.1.1.7 Liquidity 
Current ratio is used to represent liquidity which is equal to current assets divided by current liabilities. We 
expect that debt ratio is negatively correlated with liquidity of the firm simply because the firm that use more 
debt will use more current liabilities and by paying their short term obligations they will have less amount of 
current assets.  
3.1.1.8 Tangibility of Assets 
Tangible assets are collateralizable because they are acceptable to creditors as a security for issuing the debt, 
therefore if the company then default on the debt, the assets must be seized, but the company may be in a 
position to avoid bankruptcy. In an uncertain world, with asymmetric information, tangible assets are most 
widely accepted source for bank borrowing and raising secured debt. The interest rate for those firms who have 
more fixed assets will be lower because they can use this large amount of fixed assets as a security to creditors. 
On the other hand, a firm with little collateralizable assets faces the difficulty to raise funds via debt financing 
because of high cost of debt. Tangibility is measured by fixed assets divided by total assets. 
3.1.1.9 Profitability 
According to Myer and Majluf (1984) firms will go for internal finance over external finance, and firms who 
have a large amount of retained earnings (profitability) will first finance their investments with retained earnings. 
Moreover, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976, 1986) managers of profitable firms will use internal funds 
for their self interest rather than shareholders interests. Profitability is proxied by net income before taxes 
divided by total assets. 
3.2 Hypothesis 
H1: Concentrated ownership and firms leverage has significant correlation 
H2: Composition of the board and firms leverage has significant correlation 
H3: Size of the board and firms leverage has significant correlation 
H4: CEO/Chair duality and firms leverage has significant correlation 
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H5: Tangibility and firms leverage has significant correlation 
H6: Profitability and firms leverage has significant correlation 
H7: Liquidity and firms leverage has significant correlation 
H8: Firm size and firms leverage has significant correlation 
4. Discussion of Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables discussed above. Descriptive 
statistics include the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, values for the period 2008-
2012. The data contains 24 banks listed in the, “Karachi Stock Exchange”.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean                Median                     Min                      Max         Std. Deviation  
 
DR   0.8378 0.8124 0.4924 1.1547 0.1142 
OC  0.63524  0.69245  0.0000   1.0000 0.19523 
BC 0.55247  0.61247 0.0000   1.0000 0.21457 
BS  4.2541  5.3245 3.0000   7.0000 0.39524 
CEO 0.06825  0.0000 0.0000   1.0000 0.21547 
PROF 0.0549  0.0199                  -0.1120 0.2841 0.0499 
TANG 0.0587  0.0251 0.0039 0.5449 0.1014 
LIQ                 1.3321 1.0452                     0.5120 2.5421 0.2429 
SIZE         10.2457      11.1900         6.41002              13.7612             1.1452 
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Table 2: Result of Regression Output  
 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error      t-Statistic Prob.   
 
    
OC                                                        0.11254                   0.019524                  3.25414*         0.0000 
BC                                                        0.000241                 0.004524                  0.04524           0.6524 
BS                                                         0.049575                0.02451                     2.1368**          0.0328 
Duality                                                 0.005624                 0.004578                 0.67854        0.49524 
Profitability -0.327480 0.075326         -4.347495*    0.0000 
                  
Tangibility 0.077511 0.045258   1.712626***      0.0878 
Liquidity -0.055972 0.024483 
              -
2.28613**       0.0229 
Size 0.067685 0.002625   25.78178*       0.0000 
Intercept                                              0.255100                     0.048527        5.256818*             0.0000 
 
R-squared 0.574214     Mean dependent var 0.653214 
Adjusted R-squared 0.564572     S.D. dependent var 0.235475 
S.E. of  regression 0.124810     Akaike info criterion -1.785324 
Sum squared  resid 4.635471     Schwarz criterion -1.452142 
Log likelihood 231.4523     F-statistic 49.23142 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.624457     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 10% level. 
 
In this study R-square value is 57%. Profitability is found to be negatively correlated with firm’s debt ratio. It 
means that profitable firms in Pakistani banking sector maintain low debt ratios. The results show that ownership 
concentration and dependent variable capital structure are significantly positively correlated. The association 
between firms leverage and explanatory variable board composition is positive but this relation is insignificant 
thus our hypothesis which predicts significant link between board composition and leverage is not supported. 
Further it was found that leverage increases as size of the board increases and this relationship is statistically 
significant thus our hypotheses cannot be rejected. As shown in Table, the coefficient of CEO is not statistically 
significant; this indicates that CEO duality has no significant effect on capital structure; thus our hypothesis is 
not supported. Tangibility, with positive coefficient is significantly related to debt. The finding is in conformity 
with the prediction of Jenson and Meckling (1976) and Myer’s (1977). The advantage of debt investment is that 
creditors receive uninterruptible stream of income due to debt investment except in case of bankruptcy.  
Creditors have no tension about the interest payment by firm on their debt, if the firm is performing well.  But it 
well be difficult for them to continuously monitor the operations and performance of the firm, therefore they can 
overcome this trouble by asking the security of fixed assets like land, building, machinery etc. Thus creditors 
will be willing to give loans to those firms who provide there fixed assets as a security against debt. Therefore 
firms with less fixed assets cannot borrow large amount of debt because of high cost of debt, but on the other 
hand firms with higher amount of fixed assets in total assets can borrow more due to lower interest rate. 
Similarly, the results between liquidity of the firms and its debt ratio show significant negative relationship in 
banking sector. Companies with high liquidity tend to use less amount of debt, simply because it provides an 
indication that firms generally finance their activities by internal funds. The relationship between size and 
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dependent variable debt ratio is positive and statistically significant. This means that larger firms have high debt 
ratio. Considering the fact that large firms are more diversified, bear less risk and have more consistent cash 
flows, therefore they can afford higher levels of debt.  
5. Conclusion  
The purpose of the present study is to investigate whether there is any relationship between some specific 
features of corporate governance and capital structure of listed banks in the “Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)”. 
We have selected 24 banks which were listed on the KSE during the period of 2008-2012. The Ownership 
Concentration, Board composition, Board Size, and CEO duality were considered as independent corporate 
governance variables while firm specific control variables were size, liquidity, profitability and tangibility of 
assets. Debt ratio is taken as a dependent variable representing firm’s financing decision (capital structure). The 
results indicate a positive relationship between Ownership Concentration, Board Size, and capital structure. 
However no significant relationship was found between Board composition, CEO duality and capital structure. 
We use panal least square regression to determine the affect of corporate governance and firm level 
characteristics on capital structure. 
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